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Abstract 
Parliamentary party group leaders take centre stage in contemporary parliaments. To this day, 
however, their functioning remains rather understudied. Drawing on the parliamentary role 
literature, and using a series of in-depth interviews with (current and former) PPG leaders, this 
paper examines the self-reported role orientations of PPG leaders in Belgium. Unlike 
commonly-assumed theoretical dispositions on ‘position roles’, and despite Belgian PPG 
leaders’ limited formal authority as intermediaries between the central party elite and 
backbenchers, we do find role variation among PPG leaders. We more specifically find that 
PPG leaders, following a ‘logic of appropriateness’ and divergent personal motivations, differ 
on two dimensions (an external focus vs. an internal focus and a focus on top-down versus 
bottom-up liaison) leading to four distinct PPG leadership role types. As such, this study has 
important implications for parliamentary role research (and their conceptions of leadership 
roles) and should encourage scholars to focus also on frontbench roles.  
 
 
Keywords: Parliamentary party groups, parliamentary party group leaders, legislatures, 
parliamentary roles, Belgium 
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1. Introduction 
Parliamentary party group leaders (PPG leaders) are central players in modern parliaments. They 
manage their parties’ legislative branches, oversee group members’ activities and coordinate intra-party 
deliberation. They take the floor in important debates and bargain over legislative agendas. In the 
literature, PPG leaders’ core task is often boiled down to ensuring the party’s collective accountability 
to the electorate by safeguarding group unity and enforcing discipline (Cox & McCubbins, 1993; Strøm 
& Müller, 2009). To this end, they control a number of incentives that reward cooperative legislators 
and punish those who defect (Bailer, 2017; Bowler, Farrell, & Katz, 1999; Kam, 2009).  
Quite surprisingly, research on PPG leaders is limited. Insights into the daily functioning of these 
influential actors, going beyond a discussion of their access to disciplinary tools, would nonetheless be 
highly relevant. Particularly in Western Europe, PPG leaders have the ability to influence the behaviour 
of members of parliament (MPs) in case of preference heterogeneity (Müller, 2000; Saalfeld & Strøm, 
2014). Research on their modus operandi would further open ‘the black box of group member-leader 
interactions’ (Bailer, 2017, p. 13) and provide insights on intra-party decision-making in parliament, 
which typically takes place ‘behind closed doors’ (Heidar & Koole, 2000) .  
Drawing on parliamentary role literature (Andeweg, 2014; Blomgren & Rozenberg, 2012; Müller & 
Saalfeld, 1997) this paper presents an in-depth study of PPG leaders’ own role orientations. We focus 
on Belgium, where PPG leaders act as important intermediaries between the party’s backbenchers and 
central party elite (De Winter, 1992; Pilet & Wauters, 2014). Adopting an inductive approach (e.g. 
Searing, 1994), the aim of the paper is (1) to provide a detailed account of the self-reported role attitudes 
(and to some extent also the behaviours) of Belgian PPG leaders and (2) to investigate to what extent 
there is role variation. A series of in-depth interviews with (current and former) PPG leaders in the 
federal and Flemish parliament provide us with rich data on their self-perceived priorities, time 
allocation, personal goals and motivations and strategies for resolving intra-party disagreement.   
Contradictory to commonly-accepted theoretical assumptions on leadership roles (see below) and 
despite their limited formal authority in the Belgian ‘partitocracy’ due to the dominance of extra-
parliamentary party elites (De Winter & Dumont, 2006), we do observe role variation among PPG 
leaders on two concrete dimensions: (1) respondents that adopt a clear external focus versus those who 
focus mostly on the internal PPG management and (2) respondents that mostly value top-down liaison 
(communicating party leadership decisions to backbenchers) versus those who prioritize bottom-up 
liaison. Based on these dimensions we identify four PPG leader role types. As leadership (or position) 
roles are traditionally considered to be heavily constrained by institutional norms, leaving little leeway 
for individual interpretation (Searing, 1994; Strøm, 1997), this has important implications for 
parliamentary role research, and should encourage scholars to focus also on frontbench roles.  
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The paper starts with a review of the literature on PPG leadership. Afterwards, we discuss contemporary 
approaches on parliamentary roles and formulate our critique on their (rigid) assumptions regarding 
leadership roles. We then discuss the interview data and report our main findings on the role orientations 
(and behaviours) of PPG leaders in Belgium.  
2. PPGs and their leaders 
Parliamentary party groups (PPG) are critical components of legislative organization (Heidar & Koole, 
2000, p. 1; Saalfeld & Strøm, 2014, p. 372). Usually composed MPs with the same party affiliation1, 
PPGs promote stability, decisional efficiency and allow individual MPs to influence policy through 
preference aggregation (Laver, 1999; Saalfeld & Strøm, 2014). They furthermore enable ‘responsible 
party government’ by assuring that MPs act cohesively and in correspondence to the policy proposals 
for which they were mandated by the voter (Aldrich, 1995; Heidar, 2013; Mair, 2008). Although they 
vary in terms of staffing, resources and size (see: Heidar, 2000, 2013; Heidar & Koole, 2000; 
Schüttemeyer, 2001), PPGs typically rely on a division of labour (Brady & Bullock, 1985; Saalfeld & 
Strøm, 2014) by assigning their members to committees and internal policy-related working groups 
(Damgaard, 1995) and delegating the development of detailed proposals to policy experts. As delegation 
might invoke agency loss (e.g. Lupia, 2003), PPGs also typically organize along hierarchical lines. At 
the top of the pecking order, they are headed by a single PPG leader, who is sometimes assisted by a 
level of middle-management, like ‘whips’ (Norton, 2003) or working group chairs (Patzelt, 2003; 
Schüttemeyer, 2001), with the purpose of facilitating coordination and control (Heidar & Koole, 2000; 
Saalfeld & Strøm, 2014).   
PPG leaders bear a number of responsibilities that are essential for the day-to-day organization of 
parliament. Together with their direct staff and a potential second leadership tier (see above) they ensure 
the PPG’s smooth functioning. They lead discussions on party strategies and policy proposals in the 
PPG meeting (or legislative caucus) and cut the ‘Gordian knot’ in case of disagreement. Beyond the 
internal organization of the party group, PPG leaders maintain contacts with other parliamentary (party) 
leaders and co-decide on the legislative agenda within the assemblies’ governing bodies. When 
important topical and mediatized debates or bills are tabled, PPG leaders are expected to take the floor 
and elucidate the party position. Perhaps most importantly, however, PPG leaders’ personal reputations 
hinge upon their capacity to safeguard party unity (Bailer, Schulz, & Selb, 2009, p. 356; Laver, 1999, p. 
12). Legislators (may) serve multiple and potentially competing principals (Carey, 2007) and 
consequently might have rational incentives to behave in ways that lead to collectively inefficient 
outcomes (e.g. by only representing the interests of their constituency) (Aldrich, 1995; Kiewiet & 
McCubbins, 1991). In order to solve these ‘collective action problems’, which are inherent to the tension 
between legislators’ aim to get re-elected (Mayhew, 1974) and government by majority rule, parties 
need leaders that internalize the party’s collective interest and keep tabs on group members’ behaviour 
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(Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1991; Strøm & Müller, 2009). By virtue of their institutional position, these 
leaders allegedly possess a number of selective incentives (see below) that reward cooperative behaviour 
and discourage shirking (Bowler et al., 1999; Cox & McCubbins, 1993).    
Legislative party leadership has received some scholarly attention in the US Congressional literature 
(see: Strahan, 2011). Mostly drawing on rational choice theory, scholars focused on whether party 
leaders even influence legislative decisions at all (e.g. Krehbiel, 1998), if so, how (e.g. Cox & 
McCubbins, 2005) and what conditions strengthen legislative party leaders’ ability to impact policies 
(Aldrich & Rohde, 2000; Cooper & Brady, 1981).3 In Western Europe’s parliamentary democracies, 
where parties’ influence on decision-making is practically uncontested, research on PPG leaders is 
surprisingly scarce and often solely concentrates on their use of disciplinary instruments. As ideological 
agreement or voluntary loyalty might not suffice in order to induce the near perfect accounts of party 
group unity recorded in European legislatures (Depauw & Martin, 2009; Sieberer, 2006; Van Vonno et 
al., 2014) external pressures like rewards or sanctions (e.g. speaking time, promotions, staff support, 
media access) might incentivize MPs to toe the party line (Bowler et al., 1999). While some plead that 
PPG leaders rarely resort to the actual employment of such measures, as the perceived threat of their 
sheer existence might already do the trick (e.g. Andeweg & Thomassen, 2011), others argue that PPG 
leaders do use their ‘carrots and sticks’ (e.g. Bailer et al., 2009; Kam, 2009). In a recent study on five 
European parliaments, Bailer (2017) finds that PPG leaders do sometimes use disciplinary tools  (i.e. 
additional speaking time, committee seats, travel and office benefits), particularly when they lack control 
over (ex-ante) candidate selection procedures.2 
The predominant focus on PPG leaders’ use of sanctions has, however, caused scholars to neglect the 
many other duties PPG leaders fulfil (see above). Moreover, rational choice theory, on which many (US 
Congressional) studies are based, generally uses simplifying assumptions of political reality, which 
generate too parsimonious accounts of how party leaders maintain unity in the wake of preference 
homogeneity (Saalfeld & Strøm, 2014). In reality, for instance, PPG leaders might be reluctant to impose 
sanctions because it might damage their reputation within the party group (Laver, 1999). Moreover, 
backbenchers’ preferences are not necessarily fixed or exogenous to the policy-making process but 
could well be shaped by persuasion, deliberation and new substantial insights (Strahan, 2011). Lastly, 
as PPGs are not free-floating structures but are part of a larger, more complex party organization (e.g. 
Katz & Mair, 1993), backbenchers - but also PPG leaders - might be subjected to the pressures and 
wishes of extra-parliamentary party organizations (see below).   
The above-mentioned reasons call for a broader, in-depth study on PPG leaders’ functioning in 
parliament. For decades, how legislators (both in the front and backbenches ) fill in  their mandates, and 
why they do so in a specific way, has been the focal point of the literature on parliamentary roles.  
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3. Parliamentary roles and the rigidity of ‘position roles 
Grounded in sociology, roles connect individuals to a particular position within a specific social context 
(in this case legislatures) and to the norms of conduct that are associated with them (Andeweg, 2014; 
Biddle, 1986; Müller & Saalfeld, 1997). They reflect ‘an individual’s perception of what is generally 
expected of her as a holder of her current institutional position’ (Andeweg, 2012, p. 66). In its simples 
form, legislative roles are ‘comprehensive patterns of attitudes and/or behaviour shared by MPs’ 
(Blomgren & Rozenberg, 2012).3 The study of legislative roles has a long-standing and rich research 
tradition (e.g. Fenno, 1978; Wahlke et al., 1962) but gradually fell out of favour in the 1980s due to 
conceptual confusion, inconclusive results and the emergence of rational choice perspectives on political 
behaviour (Blomgren & Rozenberg, 2012; Searing, 1994). The emergence of neo-institutionalist 
approaches, however, which stress the importance of both institutional constraints (e.g. sociological 
approaches) and individual preferences (e.g. economical approaches) (March & Olsen, 1989), ushered 
in a role revival.4 Two contributions in particular have been notably successful in applying neo-
institutionalism to the role concept.    
In his seminal book ‘Westminster’s world. Understanding political roles’, Donald Searing (1994) 
presents a motivational approach for studying legislative roles, which he later applies to parliamentary 
life in the British House of Commons. Searing mixes ‘rules, roles and reasons’ by recognizing that roles 
are embedded in institutional contexts, while simultaneously treating role players as purposive actors 
with a free will: politicians are not locked up in social cages of conformity, nor do they operate within 
an institutional vacuum. According to Searing, roles are shaped by (1) formal rules, which are written 
down in the organization’s constitutional code, (2) informal norms, i.e. the expectations towards certain 
positions that are not specified in the formal scheme and (3) individual motivations: rational career goals 
and (most importantly) psychological incentives (e.g. a sense of duty or competence, achievement) 
(Searing, 1994, pp. 19-20). These motivations are not fixed but can be redefined as role players adapt to 
their institutional environments (Searing, 1994, p. 483).  
A well-known contribution is Searing’s distinction between ‘position roles’ and ‘preference roles’. The 
former refer to leadership functions in parliament (e.g. whips) that require the performance of many 
specific duties and are therefore, according to Searing, almost completely constrained by (in)formal 
norms. The latter are connected to positions with fewer responsibilities (i.e. backbenchers) and leave 
more freedom for individual role choice. In fact, preference roles lend themselves better to applying the 
motivational approach since they allow more interplay between individual motivations and the 
institutional context. 
Although he sees merit in a number of Searing’s basic insights, Kaare Strøm (1997, p. 158) contends 
that ‘besides all charming idiosyncrasies, legislators are goal-seeking men or women’. In an attempt to 
shift closer to rational choice theory, he presents a ‘strategic approach’, in which he views roles as 
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‘behavioural strategies conditioned by the institutional framework in which parliamentarians operate’ 
(Strøm, 1997, p. 157). Roles are ‘game plans’ or ‘endogenous prescriptions as to how actors may most 
successfully and efficiently act to maximize the likelihood of whatever outcomes they favour’ (Strøm, 
1997, p. 158). Which role (or strategy) seems fit is determined by four exogenous, goal-related 
preferences: reselection, re-election, party office and legislative office. As strategies are repeated day 
after day they become routines: systematic patterns of behaviour. A core aspect of these routines is the 
allocation of one’s scarce resources (e.g. time, media access, voting power). Different goals may lead 
to different strategies and different ways of allocating resources. MPs whose sole ambition is to get re-
nominated and re-elected will, guided by the electoral system and candidate selection rules (i.e. the 
institutions that constrain and enable), adapt their behaviour to please party leaders if selection processes 
are centralised, or local party branches if selection processes are decentralised. Correspondingly, MPs 
who seek higher party office will devote more time and effort to the desires of party leaders and peers, 
even if that includes fulfilling unrewarding tasks with low electoral payoff. 
Both authors provide valuable analytical frameworks for reconstructing parliamentary roles. While 
Searing advocates ‘thick description’ and sees preferences (rational and psychological) as potentially 
endogenous to the role-taking process, Strøm promotes analytical parsimony by focusing on roles as 
strategic behaviour determined by exclusively exogenous, rational goals. Both authors, however, direct 
their insights almost exclusively on backbenchers, and appear to neglect that frontbenchers, like PPG 
leaders, have some leeway in shaping their role. In their view there seems to be one way to fill in this 
mandate, since these ‘position roles’ are to a great extent determined by institutions. This becomes 
apparent by the fact that Searing (sub)categorizes multiple backbench roles (e.g. ministerial aspirants, 
policy advocates, constituency members) while his categories for ‘position roles’ all coincide with their 
respective position (e.g. ‘whips’, ‘ministers’). Consequently, Searing’s critique that scholars in the 
1960s viewed roles too much as ‘group facts’ and neglected the considerable individual variety in roles 
across similar institutional contexts (Searing, 1994, p. 25) might also hold for his own interpretation of 
leadership roles. Strøm (1997) too sees little freedom for rationally-induced strategies for MPs holding 
leadership positions as he claims that institutions are the rules that constrain reason, whereby position 
roles (i.e. ‘fully institutionally determined strategies’) and preference roles (i.e. ‘institutionally 
unconstrained strategies’) are the polar points on a ‘continuum of constraint’.  
We disagree with this rigid conceptualization, and believe that MPs who occupy a formal leadership 
position might have some leeway in defining their roles. Applied to PPG leaders, it is perfectly plausible 
that those who belong to governing parties act differently than their colleagues who belong to opposition 
parties; that leaders of small PPGs act differently than those of large PPGs; or that group leaders 
approaching the end of their political careers conceive their roles differently than someone who is new 
to the job. As such, by investigating to what extent one can observe role variation among PPG leaders 
we will test the widely-accepted underlying assumptions on ‘position roles’. 
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4. Research design: case-selection and data 
The aims of this paper are to (1) provide a detailed account of the role orientations (and self-reported 
behaviours) of PPG leaders as important but understudied actors and (2) to test current rather rigid 
assumptions on ‘position roles’ by examining the degree to which PPG leaders showcase role variation 
within the same institutional environment. For this purpose, and given that reconstructing roles is time 
and labour-consuming, we design this study as a single-country study.  
4.1. The Belgian case 
We focus on Belgium, where the position of PPG leader, unlike in other countries, does not coincide 
with that of the overall party leader (e.g. Westminster democracies, the Netherlands) nor with the 
presidency of the extra-parliamentary party organization (EPO) (e.g. Spain, Germany) (Helms, 2000; 
Pilet & Cross, 2014).5 Instead, Belgian parties’ indisputable political leaders the EPO chairmen (Pilet & 
Wauters, 2014). These powerful actors have an important say in the selection of PPG leaders (in the 
federal and regional parliaments) who thereafter function as a ‘linking pin’ between the central party 
leaders and the party’s backbenchers (De Winter, 1992). Because of the dominance of EPO leaders over 
PPGs (De Winter & Dumont, 2006) and due to PPG leaders limited intra-party authority compared to 
other countries, Belgium could be seen as a least-likely case with regards to the expected leeway PPG 
leaders experience in defining their own role. However, their specific intermediate intra-party position 
also confronts them with a classic ‘competing principal problem’ (e.g. Carey, 2007). One the one hand, 
they can act as a representative of the central party elite, communicating the decisions of the latter to the 
MPs and ensuring their implementation in parliament. One the other hand, they can also inform the party 
elite about issues at stake at the level of the party group and defend backbenchers’ wishes and policy 
preferences at higher party echelons. This in itself is a topic worth investigating as it might provide MPs, 
who are generally seen as weak political actors in the Belgian ‘partitocracy’ (De Winter & Dumont, 
2006), an alternative route towards policy influence, outside of the parliamentary arena.     
4.2. Elite interview data and case-selection 
Searing argues that ‘the best way to understand the roles of politicians is to understand them as they do’, 
(1994, p. 10). We adhere to his motivational approach and use an inductive qualitative approach based 
on elite-interviews in order to investigate the roles of PPG leaders. Unlike Searing, however, who states 
that the very role itself consists of a motivational core (preferences) and secondary components (attitudes 
and behaviours), in this project we more distinctly try to disentangle the key components (i.e. role 
attitudes), causes (i.e. (in)formal rules, preferences) and consequences (i.e. role behaviour) of roles, for 
reasons of analysis and conceptual clarity (e.g. Figure 1).   
For the broader research project, we in fact reconstructed the institutional framework by examining the 
formal rules surrounding PPG leadership (in the parliamentary house rules and party statutes) and by 
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interviewing political actors in the close environments of PPG leaders (N=35) (e.g. MPs, party 
presidents, senior PPG and EPO staff members) about their informal role expectations.6 This paper, 
however, focuses mostly on the perspective of PPG leaders themselves, and on their self-conceived role 
attitudes and personal goals and preferences. Where relevant we also report role behaviour (although 
this will be further elaborated upon in future versions of this paper).   
Figure 1.  Analytical framework  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In total, 29 in-depth elite interviews with (current and former) PPG leaders in the Belgian federal House 
of representatives and Flemish regional parliament have been conducted.7 As party- and individual-level 
characteristics might influence role orientations (e.g. Best & Vogel, 2012) and PPG leaders’ functioning 
more specifically (Bailer et al., 2009), we selected PPG leaders from all six Flemish parties in the federal 
and Flemish parliament and pursued a maximum of heterogeneity within each party based on 
government status, PPG size and respondents political experience. In order to obtain this within party 
variance, we did not only interview current PPG leaders but also went back to earlier legislative terms.8 
In order to reduce the risk of hindsight bias and enhance the data validity (Berry, 2002), the interviews 
were well-prepared by systematically searching media outlets and incorporating questions about actual 
events during one’s term as PPG leader (e.g. important policy decisions, intra-party disagreements, 
government crises). Moreover, the interviews with other PPG and EPO actors (who were selected in a 
second phase based on the selection of PPG leaders) did not only serve as a means to detect role 
expectations, but also allowed us to triangulate findings from the PPG leader interviews.   
The interview questionnaires contained both closed and open-ended questions that, often using similar 
question wordings as Searing (1994, p. 484) gauged respondents’ priorities in parliament, the intrinsic 
aspect of being a PPG leader they found most satisfactory (and why they wanted to become it in the first 
place), their self-reported time allocation and their main personal goals and ambitions. Moreover, the 
interviews provided rich information on the internal management of the PPG organization, and on how 
PPG leaders deal with preference heterogeneity within the party group and with potential disagreement 
between the PPG and the central party headquarters.  
B. Individual preferences 
- Rational (career-related) 
goals  
- Psychological incentives 
 
C. Roles 
orientations 
(or attitudes) 
A. Institutional framework 
- Formal rules  
- Informal norms and 
values (role expectations) 
 D. Role 
behaviour 
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Table 1. Overview of  interview respondents’ (PPG leaders) characteristics9 
Party Total N 
Government status Political experience* PPG size (seats) 
Majority Opposition Inexperienced Experienced Small (<10) Medium (10-20) Large>20 
Liberals  
(VLD) 
5 4 1 2 3 0 1 4 
Socialists  
(SPA) 
5 2 3 2 3 0 4 1 
Ecologists  
(Groen) 
5 2 3 3 2 2 3 0 
Christian democr. 
(CD&V) 
5 2 3 2 3 2 1 2 
Regionalists  
(NVA) 
5 4 1 3 2 2 1 2 
Right-wing 
populists (VB) 
4 0 4 2 2 2 0 2 
Total 29 14 15 14 15 8 10 11 
*Population data reveals that PPG leaders’ prior parliamentary experience is on average 2 legislative terms. Respondents who became PPG 
leader in their first or second term as MPs are labelled as ‘inexperienced’. The others (or those with ministerial experience) as ‘experienced’.  
 
5. Research results 
5.1. The global picture: PPG leaders top priorities in parliament 
Before looking at to what extent there is role variation among PPG leaders, we take a closer look at the 
overall tasks they fulfil in Belgium. When asked about their personal top three priorities as a PPG leader 
(i.e. an open question asked at the very beginning of the interview), respondents recited a broad array of 
responsibilities that go far beyond ‘ensuring that everyone pushes the right button during votes’ (PPG 
leader 16). These duties can be appropriated to five broad categories, each with its own subtasks and 
subdivisions (see Figure 2). We additionally asked respondents to indicate on a scale from 1 to 10 how 
important a number of tasks were for them personally (1= not important, 10=really important) and how 
much time they allocated to these tasks (1= almost no time, 10 = a lot of time) (see Table 2).10  
PPG leaders are, firstly, in charge of the internal management of the PPG organization. While this also 
includes administrative tasks (HR-management, controlling the PPG budget), most PPG leaders (26 of 
29 respondents) refer to its political management as one of their top priorities. PPG leaders are 
‘playmakers’. They outline a proper division of labour at the beginning of the term (by allocating 
committee seats and specific policy portfolio’s to MPs) and assure that everyone complies with these 
initial agreements in order to avoid internal tensions. One third of the PPG leaders spontaneously 
mention that they regularly need to resolve what one respondent called ‘border conflicts’: i.e. when MPs 
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try to ‘expand their territory’ by intervening on someone else’s field of specialisation or when it’s 
unclear within whose ‘competence’ a new topic falls:    
“Sometimes, three to four MPs are already waiting at my office door by the time I get back from our weekly 
PPG meeting. Most of the times their question is: ‘a new policy issue arose within our committee, which 
one of us gets to work on it?’ Of course I understand them, they all want a place in the limelight, but it 
requires a lot of people management and, to be honest, I underestimated how much of my time it would 
cost” (Respondent 17).  
 
Figure 2. PPG leaders’ responsibilities (in Belgium) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Also the complex task of fairly distributing speaking time and opportunities for self-promotion 
(particularly oral questions in the weekly plenary ‘question time’ are popular) needs considerable 
attention in order to keep everyone satisfied and let everyone score once in a while. Relatedly, PPG 
leaders need to assure that the PPG is a strong collective entity by using every MPs’ (different) capacities 
in the best possible way. 
“MP X is not someone who I will send to an emotional debate with a minister in order to loudly and wildly 
gesticulating make a point… No, she is someone who has the talent to, almost academically, make a concise 
and critical assessment of integration policies. MP Y on the other hand comes up with great one-liners at 
the right time. He is someone who I take to general plenary debates in order to generate media attention 
(Respondent 3).  
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Particularly the more experienced PPG leaders stress their tasks coaches. They feel it is their duty to 
mentor newly elected MPs and to encourage PPG leaders to take new initiatives and provide them with 
(staff) support where needed. PPG leaders furthermore coordinate and supervise the PPGs’ 
parliamentary activities: they determine the PPG’s strategies, lead discussions on policy positions in the 
weekly PPG meeting, they monitor external communication and try to maintain ‘the helicopter view’ 
over everyone’s specialized policy work. Particularly in majority parties, this often implies ‘tempering 
the diligence and ambitions of MPs’ (Respondent 1) in order not to bring government members into 
difficulties. Lastly, PPG leaders promote both political and interpersonal cohesion. They do so 
predominantly proactively, by ensuring that everybody feels relevant and knows their role within the 
PPG (avoiding ‘border conflicts’) and by organizing working groups and (one-on-one) meetings where 
policies are discussed and developed. Parliamentary sanctions or rewards are rarely used.11 Respondents 
either claim that ‘there is not much they can do besides escalating the matter to the party president who 
decides over MP’s renomination’ (Respondent 26) or argue that sanctioning would cause them to ‘lose 
their authority and position as a coach within the group’ (Respondent 28). Instead, PPG leaders’ role 
in reaching party agreement (i.e. by convincing MPs using rational arguments or taking their specific 
concerns into account) and party loyalty (i.e. by convincing MPs not to ‘let their colleagues down’) 
seems much larger. 
“In case of disagreement, my advice is always: ‘follow the group’. And will always try to convince MPs 
that are likely to defect by providing them reasons why that is also beneficial for them. And then I don’t 
mean: ‘watch out for your job’ and stuff like that. No, I am talking about substantial and political-strategic 
arguments, like: how their voting behaviour might be misused by political adversaries. Or: ‘you are putting 
your colleagues under pressure. Because you are voting against, and they’re not. You are the good guy 
while they come out badly” (Respondent 9).  
One populist right-wing PPG leader even admitted exploiting a feeling of ‘it is us against everyone else’ 
in order to cultivate within-group loyalty.    
“Our party group has always been quite cohesive. And that was not so much my merit, but was due to 
external pressures. When the whole world is always against you, and we’ve always cultivated that feeling, 
well yes, then you obtain strong internal cohesion […]. Group pressure was decisive: you are either with 
us, or you’re not” (Respondent 13). 
PPG leaders evidently also mentioned tasks that are more external and go beyond the political 
management of the PPG. As the PPG’s primus inter pares, they are the most important spokesperson in 
the media and during parliamentary debates that concern general governmental policies (e.g. the budget, 
state of the union). Also when specific dossiers become topical, they might replace backbenchers in 
order to give more weight to the party message (see below). Table 2 shows that this is the task that PPG 
leaders on average prioritise most and many respondents claimed that a large share of their time goes to 
preparing debates and constantly trying to remain informed about the latest political developments.   
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Table 2. Respondents priorities and time allocation (N=29) 
 
Most respondents (20 out of 29) somehow also bring up their liaising tasks between the PPG and EPO 
as one of their top priorities. During formal and informal meetings with the party elite, many feel it is 
their duty to inform them about the preferences of backbenchers, which often is intended as an ‘early 
warning’ to party leaders (and government ministers) that they need to take into account their (possible) 
objections. Here, PPG leaders are furthermore in the position to co-shape party positions and strategies, 
and later ensure that they are translated into parliamentary initiatives. A similar dynamic is found in 
PPG leaders intra-coalition contacts (most notably with PPG leaders from other governing parties): here 
they try to defend the interests of their party (group) while simultaneously loyally defending 
compromises in PPG meetings by explaining why certain concessions had to be made, in order to reel 
in certain preferred policies.   
“I often played that card. I would go to meetings with coalition partners and say: “I am very sorry, but I 
cannot convince PPG member X of that. You know him too, right?” (Respondent 29) 
“Take for instance the recent government agreement on the budget. A lot of our party’s demands are 
actually incorporated in there, but then of course there are also those 1 or 2 aspects on which we had to 
concede. If you don’t watch out, your PPG members will only keep fixate on those two aspects, and feel as 
if we aren’t weighing on policy-making enough. That is something that you always have to counter, and it 
requires a lot of energy” (Respondent 27).  
 
Importance (1-10) Time allocation (1-10) 
 
Average SD Average SD 
Ensuring a good division of labour 7,72 1,69 5,62 2,04 
Lead discussions on PPG positions 7,76 1,24 5,61 1,47 
Coach PPG members 6,07 2,23 4,50 2,24 
Coach PPG Staff 5,90 2,37 3,68 1,70 
Monitor committee work 5,66 1,82 4,57 2,13 
Ensure unity 8,32 1,16 4,93 2,32 
Top down liaison (EPO to PPG) 6,38 2,47 3,93 1,84 
Bottom-up liaison (PPG to EPO) 6,32 2,13 3,79 1,75 
Codecide on parliamentary agenda 7,25 1,78 4,57 1,73 
Having frequent contacts with MPs 
from other parties 
6,07 2,23 4,54 2,10 
Having frequent contacts with party’s 
own ministers (if in majority) 
8,07 1,03 5,47 1,55 
Having frequent contacts with 
ministers from other parties 
4,25 2,46 2,75 1,73 
Publicly defend party positions as the 
PPG’s political frontrunner 
8,86 0,85 7,46 1,55 
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Lastly, PPG leaders are also member of parliament’s governing bodies (e.g. the Conference of Group 
Chairmen) where they decide over organizational matters and the political agenda. Particularly the latter 
is important, both for opposition (in order to get interpellations or topical debates on the agenda) and for 
majority PPG leaders (in order to try and block potentially detrimental debates).  
5.2. Assimilation or variation? Towards a typology of PPG leader roles  
During the interviews became apparent that there is indeed considerable variation among PPG leaders’ 
role orientations. Although some formal responsibilities allow for limited individual interpretation (e.g. 
representing the PPG in the Conference of Group chairman), many respondents themselves (27 out 29) 
acknowledged that the way they fill in their mandate probably differs from the way others did. Whereas 
some attribute this to individuals’ competence and skills (e.g. eloquence, being a policy generalist, 
political weight, personal commitment), it most of the time reflects a different logic of appropriateness 
(e.g. Andeweg, 2012; March & Olsen, 1989; Searing, 1994) in the heads of the respondents either due 
to varying party-level pressures (different expectations due to a parties’ size, government status, 
organizational culture or electoral prospects) or diverging personal goals (particularly progressive 
ambitions (e.g. Schlesinger, 1966) or the absence thereof seem important).  
 
Figure 2: PPG leader role types  
 
 
 
 
 
Spearheads 
External focus 
Internal focus 
Managers 
EPO representatives 
(Top-down liaison) 
PPG representatives 
(Bottom-up liaison) 
Party soldiers (12) 
Crisis managers (6) 
managers  
Parliamentarists (3) 
 
Instrumentalists (8) 
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In all cases, these differences somehow relate to two dimensions that can be displayed as two 
continuums that refer to inbuilt dilemma’s in the daily functioning of PPG leaders. The first is PPG 
leaders primarily adopting an external focus (i.e. respondents who see themselves mainly as the PPG’s 
political figureheads) versus those with a distinct internal focus (PPG leaders as team players, coaches 
and managers). The second dimension refers to the intra-party position of PPG leaders: while some 
mainly see themselves as representatives of the PPG in the EPO’s decision-making bodies, others adopt 
a more top-down-oriented focus aimed at transferring central party leaders’ directives to the 
backbenchers. Indeed, when clustering interviewees based on their own reports of their daily functioning, 
we find four PPG leader role-types (and potential subsequent sub-roles) that run along these two 
dimensions (see Figure 3). It should, however, be noted that these are ideal types and that within each 
category further diversifications can be observed (see below).  
5.2.1. Party soldiers  
‘Party soldiers’ adopt a clear internal focus and stress their loyalty to the central party leadership. They 
make up the largest category among the interview respondents (12 out of 29). Party soldiers tend to 
prioritize their work behind the scenes. They feel it is their duty to ensure that the PPG is a strong, well-
organized collective entity where a collegial atmosphere between PPG members – who all want a place 
in the limelight – is prevalent. They therefore prioritize their duties as playmakers (fairly dividing PPG 
resources and opportunities for self-promotion), coaches to (new) backbenchers, inspirators and 
motivators. They stress the importance of transferring their political insights and knowledge on 
parliamentary procedures to backbenchers, of helping them with the policy-related issues they encounter, 
finding the right communicative strategy, building and extending their networks, and seeking new 
opportunities for parliamentary initiatives. In terms of behaviour, this implies spending a lot of time in 
parliament and sustaining direct and accessible contacts with backbenchers:  
“It first and foremost means: being approachable. When they [PPG members] call, you pick up your phone. 
Never close your office door. When they have concerns or questions and email you, make sure to reply 
within a couple of hours. So that they feel important. Organize meetings in order to work things out. Just 
offer a ‘listening ear’ and never make them feel as if the things they struggle with are unimportant. Because 
they are all egos, you see” (Respondent 2).  
Good PPG leaders, in their view, are empathic, altruistic, know the capacities and desires of 
backbenchers, spend a lot of their time on ‘people management’ and are able to proactively detect and 
resolve problems within the PPG. Most importantly, he or she is not someone who absorbs all public 
attention but is happy with a more supportive role, even if it implies having to fulfil personally 
unrewarding tasks with low electoral pay-off (as opposed to others (see below) they value ‘internal 
legitimacy over external legitimacy). They do not solely seek personal exposure, but find most job 
satisfaction in seeing fellow PPG members grow, having a good (trust) relationship with all MPs and 
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developing a PPG with a strong collective reputation (not being dependent only on the interventions and 
work of a handful of protagonists).  
“Last week, MP X got a lot of good press on topic Y. Not that I am that vain or anything but it was mainly 
because of a communicative strategy I developed for him. Of course, that is also my job, I am a team player 
and I am glad for him, but what’s in it for me? Afterwards I sometimes think: damn, maybe I should try to 
be in the newspapers a bit more. I would like to get re-elected too, you know” (Respondent 17).   
Still, party soldiers tend to accept their place in the ‘back office’, partly because they can reside to the 
formal moments on which they are expected to take the floor (e.g. during budgetary debates) but mostly 
because they do not need the exposure as much as backbenchers do, as they tend to be experienced, 
well-known politicians. Intensively socialized within the diverse party echelons, party soldiers 
particularly value top-down liaison (by transferring policy decisions or party strategies as determined 
by the party leadership or central executive committee) to backbenchers (although, when present at the 
PPG meeting, they also expect the party president to do this). It is in fact often why they believe they 
were selected: not only because of the support of fellow PPG members for their candidacy but also 
because of their loyalty to the party leadership (one respondent described himself as a ‘safe choice’ for 
the party elite as they believed that he would not cause any trouble). Still, most respondents argue that 
official party positions are deliberated upon quite openly in the central party executive (where also PPG 
delegates are present) and that it afterwards comes down to transparently briefing these decisions in the 
PPG meeting by setting out all arguments and providing the ‘pros and cons’ of alternatives. Party 
soldiers’ apprehension that top-down liaison is important seems to stem more from the fact that all 
respondents in this category belong to majority parties, and that they see themselves as important go-
betweens between the executive and parliament. Delicate government compromises and package deals 
(implying concessions for all parties) have to be guided through the legislative process and ideological 
hardliners in the party group have to be convinced. Moreover, they often have to put the brakes on 
backbenchers’ policy-related ambitions because coalition partners oppose them. Still, it is not all a one-
way street. As they are highly preoccupied with supporting backbenchers and understand that proactive 
involvement is key in governmental policy-making through their years of political experience, they try 
to make sure that backbenchers can at least express their concerns by inviting central party elites or 
ministers to PPG meetings, or by providing other opportunities.  
A sensible minister understands that, ultimately, the PPG members have to pass their legislation through 
parliament. They should not show up when the final compromise has already been made because, of course, 
then they will encounter critiques. As a PPG leader, you have to ensure that ministers involve PPG members 
already at an early stage, so they can give their input and see for themselves how an initial proposal evolves 
towards a final compromise. We therefore organized a lot of meetings with ministers and their staff for 
which backbenchers were invited. Half  of them never showed up, but when they had critiques afterwards 
at least I could say: I am very sorry, but then you should have raised your concerns earlier, during the 
meeting (Respondent 29).  
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As mentioned, interviewees identified as party soldiers are mostly highly experienced politicians that 
belong to larger government parties. They are found in all parties under study except in the green and 
extreme-right party.       
5.2.2. Parliamentarists  
‘Parliamentarists’ constitute the second and smallest category among the interviewed PPG leaders (3 
out of 29). Very similar to the category above, parliamentarists are first and foremost preoccupied with 
the internal management of the PPG and state that they spend a lot of time in guiding backbenchers and 
supporting them in their parliamentary work. They too see themselves as team players that do not feel 
the need to claim all public attention.  
“A good PPG leader is someone who can coach a group and puts a strong team out there on the pitch.  He 
should also be able to translate the party message to a broader public, although he should not be the one 
who always takes centre stage. Instead, he should let others ‘score’ as well. Without it being obvious that 
he is the one who always gives the ‘assists’. So a certain degree of discretion. The team above all else” 
(Respondent 28).  
The main difference between ‘party soldiers’ and ‘parliamentarists’ is that the latter more distinctly than 
the former feel that it is their duty to articulate the overall position of the PPG (or individual PPG 
members) both in intra-party meetings and when addressing the broader public. Two of the three 
respondents in this category admit that the fact that their party was in opposition probably gave them 
more opportunities to expound the PPG’s positions. The third respondent, belonging to a government 
party, stated he favoured expressing the PPGs’ view because of sense that a degree of ‘dualism’ between 
the executive and the legislative branch would be desirable (not only for the party group but also for the 
party as a whole):  
As a PPG leader, it is your tasks to point out to the party’s minister: ‘Look, we also have a PPG, consisting 
of people who have opinions and visions. You have to communicate with them’. Providing that link is 
extremely important. […].  Afterwards, in parliament, you are of course expected to defend government 
decisions. But simultaneously, you are also the one that can take it a step further. As a PPG leader, you are 
not actually in government, you don’t have to identify entirely with them. You should be dare to distance 
yourself a bit from their decisions and give a sharper profile to the PPG by stressing your own demands 
and accents, of course without taking it too far. Doing so, is not only in the interest of the PPG but in the 
interest of the entire party, as governmental policies are coalition compromises (Respondent 22).   
As mentioned, the few ‘parliamentarists’ can be found both in opposition and government parties. They 
again are elder, experienced politicians (with one clear exception). Two of them belong to the green 
party, one to the liberal party.       
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5.2.1. Instrumentalists  
The third role type that can be identified are the ‘instrumentalists’. Respondents that fall in this category 
(8 out of 29 respondents) tend to see their position as leader of the PPG as something that is ‘instrumental’ 
to achieving their personal goals and ambitions. Within this group, a further distinction can be made 
based on PPG leaders’ political experience and the objectives they pursue. A first subgroup are ‘status 
protectors’ (5 respondents). These respondents are seasoned politicians that do not necessarily have 
progressive career ambitions but do tend to use their PPG leadership as a personal power base, or a 
means that allows them to gain public visibility and (still) exert influence in intra-party decision-making. 
‘Status protectors’ often actively lobbied (or ‘pushed through’ as one respondent puts it) in order to be 
become PPG leader as they ‘did not want to be demoted directly to a normal MP’ (Respondent 10) after 
being a minister or party president or because they ‘felt like they were wasting away in the backbenches’ 
(Respondent 23). PPG leadership confirms their status within the party, provides them a public forum 
and puts them (back) in the party’s decision-making cockpit. A second subgroup, labelled ‘prodigies’ 
(3 respondents), refers to younger, less experienced but talented politicians that were selected as a PPG 
leader by the party leadership with the explicit intention of providing them with a ‘launching platform’. 
Holding the office of PPG leader allows them to gain public visibility and to learn how to cope with 
political responsibility.  
“A basic expectation, for a young PPG leader like me, was: ‘Go forth and multiply.’ Become well-know, 
if possible also popular, ensure that you get votes at the next general elections, and – I don’t know – maybe 
become a minister afterwards” (Respondent 1).   
Unlike the previous two role types, instrumentalists have a more distinct external focus. In their view, a 
good PPG leader is foremost a frontrunner and a good debater. Someone who eloquently transfers the 
party message in parliament and towards the media. They tend to find the internal management of the 
PPG (coaching MPs, providing a fair division of labour, resolving internal conflicts) of secondary 
importance or even state that it ‘requires a lot of your time, but distracts you from the essence: being a 
spokesperson, preparing debates, going to television appearances, doing parliamentary interventions’ 
(Respondent 13).  
They enjoy ‘being in the picture’ (Respondent 23) and like that – as opposed to backbenchers, who 
(need to) specialize in a specific policy field – they can intervene in a broad spectrum of topics in 
parliament. While also instrumental for their personal fame and status, they believe that the PPG leader 
(instead of other PPG members) should take the floor when an issue becomes a hot topic in order to give 
more political weight to the PPG message. Convinced that the media (increasingly) focus on key figures 
within the PPG, they argue that this is electorally interesting for the party as well. This opposes the idea 
of PPG leaders as playmakers and during the interviews, several accounts have been raised of intra-PPG 
tensions and frustrations among backbenchers, who prepare their cases and build up expertise on highly 
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specialized policy issues, but do not get the opportunity to take the floor and generate personal media 
attention as soon as the issue becomes topical.  
Instrumentalists (and particularly ‘status protectors’) tend to use their position as PPG leaders to 
influence overall party policies and strategies. They contend that they mostly see it as their task to 
promote the views and interest of the PPG in the central party decision-making bodies, although also 
their own policy views matter (one PPG leader in this category stated that he was not ‘a mail carrier’ 
and that backbenchers with personal wishes or grievances should not hide behind the PPG leader but 
contact the party elite themselves). While ‘prodigies’ seem more inclined to practice top-down liaison 
and act as a central party representative in the PPG because of their dependence of the party elite for 
their future careers, several (elder) respondents in the ‘status protector’ category state that the party 
president should come to the PPG meeting personally in order to defend difficult party decisions as it 
would cause them to lose their authority within the group.  
“When the party president wants to bring a difficult message to the PPG members, he should do it himself. 
I don’t do that, because then I lose my authority within the group. The PPG should be behind me at all 
times. They should feel as if I am defending their interests in the central party executive committee. And 
not have the impression that I am only a puppet of the party executive that pushes through all the party 
decisions that they don’t want to defend themselves in the PPG. That really wouldn’t be a good idea” 
(Respondent 13).  
Instrumentalists can be found in all parties under study. While they most often belong to opposition 
parties, two respondents in this category belonged to government parties.    
5.2.2. Crisis managers 
‘Crisis managers’ make up a last distinct category among PPG leaders (6 out of 29 respondents). The 
main common ground among respondents in this category is that they belong to parties that suffered 
large electoral losses in the foregoing elections (and often ended up in opposition). In all cases, these 
electoral defeats have been the harbinger for internal party renewal. New party presidents with renewed 
policy agendas and political strategies were appointed in order to turn the electoral tide. On their turn, 
these party presidents appointed relatively unknown politicians as new PPG leaders who, together with 
him or her, are expected to embody the new political course of the party. As a result, the PPG leaders 
that fall into this category all stress their loyalty to the new party presidents and mainly prioritize top-
down liaison: they feel that is their duty to convince the other MPs of the new programmatic or political-
strategic course the party is heading and try to support the party leader in his endeavours. Practically all 
of them state that this is not always easy as those renewed party policies and strategies might invoke 
opposition among the party’s elder, more experienced MPs.  
“A clear expectation was for me to make the clear change of course as outlined by the party leader. Both in 
terms of style and policies. Not always the hard bickering, not focusing solely on socio-economic topics. 
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Working on a new image, one that people wouldn’t directly ascribe to our party. And embodying that image. 
Actively challenge people to address new topics. And remain loyal to the renewed party strategies as set 
out by the new party leader and the people that supported them” (Respondent 3).  
“While our party president is trying to set out a new programmatic course, there is always that one person 
in the PPG of whom you’re never sure what he will say during plenary meetings […]. That is why… where 
it often used to be the PPG meeting that decided on which position to take in parliament, I will now escalate 
the discussion more quickly to the central party executive committee. It is easier to push things through 
when you’re backed by the entire central party elite. I do not always use that as leverage, but sometimes I 
do” (Respondent 11).  
In order to ‘embody the new party message’, PPG leaders that fall in the category of ‘crisis managers’ 
appear to adopt a clear external focus. A good PPG leaders is a good communicator, who does not act 
primarily out of self-interest but convincingly tries to translate the renewed party policies to a broader 
audience in a comprehensible way. More than ‘instrumentalists’, however, ‘crisis managers’ are also 
preoccupied with the internal management of the party as a priority. They face greater disunity (see 
above) and state that they put a lot of effort in convincing fellow PPG members and avoiding that 
dissidence reaches the outside world, given the already precarious situation the party finds itself in.  
6. Discussion  
PPG leaders are understudied but important actors that, particularly in Western European parliaments, 
have an impact on the internal functioning of party groups (and thus parliaments at large) and on the 
behaviour of individual MPs. Following an inductive approach and using data from in-depth elite 
interviews with 29 (current and former) PPG leaders in the Belgian federal and Flemish parliament, this 
paper presented an explanatory study of the role orientations of these influential actors. Besides giving 
a general overview of their own conceptions of what their job in parliament entails (going beyond their 
access and use of sanctions in order to keep PPG members in line), we tried to uncover role variation.  
In contradiction to commonly-assumed (and overly-simplifying) prepositions on parliamentary 
leadership (or ‘position’) roles, and despite their limited formal authority in Belgium as intermediates 
between the powerful central party elite and the party’s backbenchers, we did find that PPG leaders do 
conceive of their main duties and responsibilities differently. While some PPG leaders adopt a clear 
external focus aimed at translating party policies to a broader (parliamentary and public) audience, 
others are content with their place behind the scenes as managers and playmakers. Moreover, while 
some primarily see it as their duty to convince fellow PPG members of central party elite decisions 
(often in majority parties or in times of electoral adversity) others see it as their duty to more actively 
try to co-shape central party policies by defending the interests and policy positions of the PPG 
(members). Based on these two dimensions, we developed a typology of four ideal-type PPG leader 
roles (‘party soldiers’, ‘instrumentalists’, ‘parliamentarists’ and ‘crisis managers’) and delineated how 
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PPG leaders in each of these groups conceive of their roles differently. We described their respective 
personal priorities in parliament as well as the underlying motivations that lie at the basis of their role 
orientations. 
This study has important implications for parliamentary role research, which – driven by seminal 
influential analytical approaches (Searing, 1994; Strøm, 1997) – has long assumed that MPs occupying 
leadership positions in parliament have limited leeway in defining their roles (given that ‘position roles’ 
are heavily constrained by institutional pressures). As such, it should encourage scholars to not only 
examine backbench roles but also investigate frontbench roles given the potential impact of their 
functioning on parliamentary decision-making. Future research should examine the roles of PPG leaders 
in different political settings and further try to disentangle the causes of diverging PPG leader roles more 
in detail (e.g. under what circumstances do PPG leaders play a certain role; what happens when role 
expectations (of MPs, party leaders) conflict with a PPG leaders’ personal goals). Moreover it could 
also investigate the consequences of PPG leaders’ role orientations. How (and to what extent) are 
different role attitudes translated into characteristic role behaviour? What are the implications of PPG 
leaders’ adopting certain roles for the internal organisation of PPGs and the parliamentary work of PPG 
members? 
7. Footnotes 
1. They might also consist of MPs that belong to different parties but wish to collaborate in the 
parliamentary arena, safe when they do so for exclusively for technical reasons (e.g. obtaining more 
financial support) (Heidar & Koole, 2000)  
2. Many studies, however, do not analyse the actual use of disciplinary measures but take their 
existence as a given, and concentrate directly on the moderating effects of institutional variables on 
party unity (e.g. Carey, 2007, p. 13; Coman, 2015; Sieberer, 2006).   
3. Some see roles as ‘interrelated goals, attitudes and behaviours (Searing, 1994, p. 369), others only 
as regularised patterns of behaviour (Strøm, 1997, p. 155). Andeweg (2014, p. 269) proposes to 
make a clear distinction between role attitudes (or orientations) and role behaviour. The former are   
‘an individual’s perception of what is generally expected of her as a holder of her current 
institutional position’ (Andeweg, 2012, p. 66) which might (or not) be translated into characteristic 
and observable behaviour.  
4. See however, Andeweg (2014) on this topic.  
5. In the mentioned countries that go by the rules of dualism, PPG leaders often are the parties’ 
electoral and political frontrunner, unless the party leader becomes a government minister and is 
obliged to resign from parliament.   
6. These research findings will be reported elsewhere.  
7. The interviews were conducted between May 2017 and May 2018 and lasted on average 70 minutes 
(the shortest took 35 minutes, the longest almost three hours). All interviews were tape-recorded, 
fully transcribed and subsequently coded using the NVivo-software package in order to structure 
the textual data and delineate (inductively-derived) role types. Following a similar approach to other 
studies (Navarro, 2012, p. 208), we went back to the individual transcripts in a second stage, in order 
to match interview partners to the role patterns.  
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8. We mainly did this so that in every party (except VB) we would have both majority and opposition 
PPG leaders. In practice, we therefore had to go back until the 1999-2003/4 period. A single 
respondent was a PPG leader in the legislative term before that (1995-1999). 
9. In order to guarantee respondents’ anonymity, we do not report individual characteristics per PPG 
leader. In several occasions, due to the fact that respondents were PPG leaders multiple times or 
over a long period of time, PPG leaders in fact fit into multiple columns of this table (e.g. having 
chaired both a small and a larger PPG). In that case, the values attributed in the table then reflect on 
what period the interviews primarily focused.  
10. We opted for a relative scale from 1 to 10 in order to grasp time allocation instead of absolute 
categories (e.g. every day, once a week) in order to see more easily whether role attitudes (i.e. 
perceived importance) are also translated in role behaviour (i.e. time allocation).  
11. Although some PPG leaders did admit having withheld staff support, speaking time and 
opportunities for self-promotion (mainly plenary questions during PM question time) when MPs 
made bold public statements.  
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